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1. Introduction
On 17 February 2008 Kosovo approved its declaration of independence 
from Serbia.1 The declaration was raised as a unilateral secession, a 
category which to date is widely debated by the international com-
munity, but supported in that case by a large proportion of the Unit-
ed Nation member states.2 As is well known, on 8 October 2008, 
through its resolution 63/3, the United Nations General Assembly issued 
a request for an advisory opinion to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Serbia sought to have the court’s opinion on whether the dec-
Article received 16/01/12; approved 29/02/12.
1. The translation into English of the full text of the declaration of independence of Ko-
sovo is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm (last visited on 7 De-
cember 2011).
2. When the Advisory Opinion was delivered 69 of the UN’s 192 member states recognized 
Kosovo.108
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laration was in breach of international law and also to reopen the 
negotiating process for determining the future of Kosovo.3 In a trial 
vote 120 of the 192 members gave their backing to Serbia’s request 
to refer the matter to the ICJ.4 The question was framed as follows:
Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with 
international law?
The question was resolved by the International Court of Justice 
through the Advisory Opinion (AO) of 22 July 2010 on the Accordance 
with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence 
in respect of Kosovo.5 In this study we shall analyse some of the aspects 
arising from this ruling, focusing on the territorial issue. Firstly we 
shall analyse the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States 
and how it operates, and secondly, we shall focus on the scope of that 
principle in relation to the interior of the State, and ask how interna-
tional law operates in relation to declarations of independence. Last-
ly, we shall deal with the principle of respect for territorial integrity 
in the specific case of Serbia with respect to Kosovo, and then end 
with a series of general conclusions.
2.  Territorial Integrity and International Law:  
A Principle That Operates Between States
The notion of territorial integrity is employed by very few interna-
tional instruments. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter stipulates 
that “[A]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
3. A finding determining the declaration of independence unlawful might have returned 
Kosovo to the previous status, the status of an entity under international administration. 
Kosovo would have to resume negotiations on status and continue these until Serbia was 
ready to agree a settlement.
4. In the real vote, the United Nations General Assembly adopted this proposal on 8 October 
2008 with 77 votes in favour, 6 votes against and 74 abstentions. See United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 63/3 Request for an advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is in 
accordance with international law (A/RES/63/3).
5. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), General List No. 
141, 22 July 2010, hereafter Kosovo AO. 109
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the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.” Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter does not affect directly individuals or peoples, but rather, the 
relations between States.
The other important international instrument that refers the 
territorial integrity is the Helsinki Final Act (adopted on Aug. 1, 1975), 
requiring the following: “[T]he participating States will refrain in 
their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in 
general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any State …”. The Helsinki Final Act 
condemns the use of force against territorial integrity: the use of 
external force or threat of use it against the territorial integrity and 
political independence. Nevertheless the Helsinki Final Act does not 
unconditionally advocate for the absolute maintenance of territorial 
integrity. Chapter 1 specifically holds that “[f]rontiers can be changed, 
in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by 
agreement.”6 Within the domain of this provision the notion of ter-
ritorial integrity is closely linked to the question of the use of exter-
nal force, and is explicitly addressed to the participating States.
The principle of territorial integrity of states is well established 
and is protected by a series of consequential rules prohibiting in-
terference within the domestic jurisdiction of states.7 The principle 
of territorial integrity is traditionally interwoven with the funda-
mental principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force. 
The principle appears to conflict on the face of it with another 
principle of international law, that of the self-determination of peo-
ples.8 As a general principle, the right to self determination will be 
exercised by peoples within the framework of the existing states, 
consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those 
states.9 Although, following the traditional theory, the right to uni-
6. See also the Guidelines on recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union adopted by the European Community and its member states on 16 December 1991, 
92 ILR, p. 173. 
7. See Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) p. 443 et seq.
8. See inter alia ICJ, Burkina Faso v. Mali, ICJ reports, 1986, pp. 554; 80 ILR, p. 469.
9. See J. Crawford, “State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession” 69 BYIL, 
1998, p. 85.110
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lateral secession arises only in the most extreme cases, and under 
carefully defined circumstances (colonial situations where the group 
is subject to extreme and unremitting persecution).10 The Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Quebec case11 suggested also that secession 
might also apply to cases as a last resort where a people’s right to 
internal self-determination was blocked.12 In fact state practice shows 
that territorial integrity limitations on the right of self-determination 
are often ignored, as seen in the recognition of the independence 
of Bangladesh (from Pakistan), Singapore (from Malaysia), and Belize 
(“despite the claims of Guatemala”). In the same way, as the ICJ has 
highlighted, in the case of declarations of independence outside the 
context of the international law of self-determination (even during 
the second half of the twentieth century), the practice of the states 
does not point to the emerge in international law of a new rule 
prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such 
cases.13 The ICJ considers that there is no emerging prohibition of 
secession as arising from the principle of territorial integrity.
In the Kosovo AO the ICJ has not challenged the traditional 
conception that the non-state entities are not addressed by the rule 
of territorial integrity but it has strengthened this view, as we will see 
below. In fact, the argument upheld by Serbia in the legal proceedings 
was that international law guarantees respect for the territorial in-
tegrity of States as arising from the principle of sovereignty and equal-
ity between States.14 This position was also defended by other mem-
ber states.15 The ground for maintaining this stance was that 
10. Inter alia A. Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 120. J. Castellino, International law and Self-Deter-
mination (The Hague: Martinus Nihjhoff, 2000); Theodore Christakis, Le droit à 
l´autodétermination en dehors des situations de décolonisation (Paris: La documentation 
française, 1999) p. 35 et seq.
11. Supreme Court of Canada Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR.
12. Supra note 11, at paragraph 348 et seq.
13. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 79.
14. CR 2009/24 hearing of 1 December 2009, Serbia, paragraphs 4-6 pp. 63-65.
15. Among others, Russia, CR 2009/30 hearing of 8 December 2009, paragraphs 5-7, p. 41 
and paragraph 34: “[t]he duty to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity exists 
independently from resolution 1244. It is a legal obligation stemming from peremptory 
norms of international law. Those norms are binding not only upon Member States, but 
upon all subjects of international law.” See also Spain CR 2009/30 hearing of 8 December 
2009, paragraph 31 p. 16; China CR 2009/29 30 hearing of 7 December 2009 paragraph 15, 
p. 33.111
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territorial integrity has been assumed in many texts of international 
law, quoting Art. 2 of the United Nations Charter,16 to conclude the 
following: “[f]ew principles in present-day international law have been 
so firmly established as that of territorial integrity which requires that 
the very territorial structure and configuration of a State be respect-
ed. In addition to constituting one of the key elements in the concept 
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity has been seen as essential 
in the context of the stability and predictability of the international 
legal system as a whole”.17
The opposite stance was upheld, among others, by the United 
States of America, for whom the unilateral declaration of independ-
ence does not violate the general principle of territorial integrity, 
insofar as this principle operates on a different plane: “[F]or that 
basic principle calls upon States to respect the territorial integrity of 
other States. But it does not regulate the internal conduct of groups 
within States, or preclude such internal groups from seceding or de-
claring independence”.18 This view is in line with the dominant opin-
ions of scholarship. Following Georges Abi-Saab “[I]t would be errone-
ous to say that secession violates the principle of territorial integrity 
of the State, since this principle applies only in international relations, 
i.e. against other States that are required to respect that integrity and 
not encroach on the territory of their neighbours; it does not apply 
within the State”.19
In the Kosovo AO the International Court of Justice underlines 
the substantial relevance of the principle of territorial integrity in 
international law20 and interprets its subjective scope using as a ba-
16. See also the Colonial Declaration, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); the Declaration 
on Principles, General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV); the Definition of Aggression, Gene-
ral Assembly 3314 (XXIV) and the United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly 
resolution 55/2 affirmed in the World Summit Outcome, General Assembly resolution 60/1, 
paragraph 5. Also the Helsinki Final Act 1975; the Charter of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States 1992; and the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended 
in 1967, 1985, 1992 and 1993. See Written Statement of Serbia, paragraph 440 et seq.
17. Serbia CR 2009/24 hearing of 1 December 2009, paragraph 4, p. 63.
18. See United States of America (Mr. Harold Hongju Koh) CR 2009/30 hearing of 8 December 
2009, paragraph 20, p. 30.
19. Georges Abi-Saab, “Conclusion”, in Marcelo Kohen (ed.) Secession: International Law 
Perspectives (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 474.
20. Affirming “[t]he Court recalls that the principle of territorial integrity is an important 
part of the international legal order and is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, 
in particular in Article 2, paragraph 4” (Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 80).112
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sis two relevant texts: the General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) 
of 1970, entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” and the Final 
Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope of 1 August 1975 (the Helsinki Conference).21 The conclusion 
of the International Court is that “[t]he scope of the principle of 
territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between 
States”.22
The interpretation of the Court is held as balanced on the basis 
of the traditional view that international law remains neutral in regard 
to secession.23 Upholding the strictly inter-sate character of the ter-
ritorial integrity principle, the Court refused to challenge the “legal 
neutrality” thesis.24 The principle of the territorial integrity of States 
is a basic principle of international law that operates on the sphere 
of relations between states. The territorial integrity of States is an 
international law principle that operates with regard to some subjects 
and to some circumstances, but not in an absolute or unlimited way 
preventing the exercise of rights also recognised by international law 
to other subjects.25 The prototypical example could be the right of 
21. As regards the first of these texts, the General Assembly reiterated “[t]he principle 
that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. This resolution 
then enumerated various obligations incumbent upon States to refrain from violating the 
territorial integrity of other sovereign States. In the same vein, the Final Act of the Hel-
sinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1 August 1975 (the Helsinki 
Conference) stipulated that “[t]he participating States will respect the territorial integrity 
of each of the participating States” (Art. IV).
22. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 80 (in fine).
23. As an exception, a declaration of independence can, in some situations (and especially 
in the case of external aggression), be illegal and create an unlawful situation. See Theodore 
Christakis, “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law Something to Say 
about Secession?” Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011) p. 82. See also, the same 
author “L’obligation de non-reconnaissance des situations créés par le recours illicite à la 
force ou d’autres actes enfreignant des règles fondamentales” in Ch. Tomuschat and J.M. 
Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and 
Obligations Erga Omnes (2005) at 134.
24. See Oliver Corten “Territorial Integrity Narrowly Interpreted: Reasserting the Clasical 
Inter-Sate Paradigm of International Law”Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011), 
p. 89.
25. If this were not understood as being so, state sovereignty would imply the blocking 
of the status quo of states, which could possibly amount to a violation of international 
law (supposing a military occupation, or a state were to act against a people through il-113
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self-determination. In any event the Kosovo AO appears to point not 
so much in the positive legal entitlement (the right to secede) as in 
the absence of a general international law prohibiting the declara-
tions of independence.26 The legal neutrality argument seems to be 
applicable regardless of the legitimating title but not regardless of 
the procedural circumstances, as we will see below.
The principle of territorial integrity has clearly external effects. 
Nevertheless it could have also internal effects when applying inter-
national law. We could think on the external support or promotion of 
secessionist movements. Another example could be if there is not com-
pliance with the requirements imposed by the international law when 
applying international law rights as the external self-determination 
(where appropriate) or remedial secession. If the requirements are not 
fulfilled the territorial integrity could oppose to relay to such an inter-
national collective right. However the Kosovo AO seems to show us 
that secession could be brought about aside from international law 
categories (even if human rights law and possibly the law of armed 
conflicts are always applicable). In other words, the ban on unilateral 
secession27 is not a ban on sub-state actors but a ban on states to rec-
ognize entities created such unlawful circumstances. We will come back 
to this point later when analyzing issues regarding the recognition by 
third states.
The pronouncement of the ICJ has a substantially wider signifi-
cance. It refused to admit some new extensive interpretation of the 
rule of territorial integrity. As is well known there has been argued 
that the ius cogens status of the prohibition of the use of force against 
the political independence and territorial integrity of states also extends 
to protection from threats from within. Mainly since the beginning of 
this century, the classical conception of the legal neutrality is challenge 
by those thinking that the increasing threat posed by terrorist or oth-
legal uses of force or violate other peremptory norms, such as the prohibition against 
apartheid).
26. The Kosovo AO seems to circumvent the basics of international law by avoiding the 
discussion of most difficult issues thereof and by offering pragmatic, politically inclined 
solutions instead. See Milena Sterio “The Kosovar Declaration of Independence: “Botching 
the Balkans” or Respecting International Law?” Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 37 (2009) 2, p. 289.
27. In the Kosovo AO the ICJ addresses declarations of independence but what was really 
at stake was not the declaration as a speech act, but secession. The Court recognizes this 
when analyses the legal scope of the territoriality principle (see Anne Peters “Does Kosovo 
Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?” Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011) at 96. 114
REAF, núm. 16, octubre 2012, p. 107-140
Iñigo Urrutia Libarona
er groups should lead to a new interpretation extending the rule pro-
hibiting the use of force to non-state entities.28 This view was not 
supported by the ICJ. As Oliver Corten highlights, it is significant that 
the Court strongly insists on the inter-state character of Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter; it appears therefore incompatible with any attempts 
to “denationalize” or “privatize” this article.29 The general obligation 
of respecting the territorial integrity of States is of an erga omnes 
nature but such obligation only concerns parties subject to interna-
tional law.30 The remaining open question is to know whether the view 
that precludes any applicability of the territorial integrity principle 
between the state and the non-state actor could affect a contra sensu 
the effectiveness of the remedial secession doctrine.
It is important to stress that in spite of the ICJ’s narrow interpre-
tation of the subjects concerned by Article 2(4) of the Charter, the 
ratio materiae of this Article is not unrelated to the other subjects. The 
ICJ gave examples for declaration of independence that were tainted 
by the illegal use of force, and were condemned by the Security Coun-
cil.31 The ICJ stated that “[t]he illegality attached to the declarations 
of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of 
these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would 
have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egre-
gious violations of norms of general international law, in particular 
those of a peremptory character (ius cogens).”32 A declaration of inde-
pendence adopted in breach of the principle of non-use of force is 
considered illegal.33 In other words, the principle of territorial integ-
28. See Oliver Corten The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Con-
temporary International Law (Hart Publishing, 2010) in toto; T. Franck, “Terrorism and the 
Right of Self-defense” AJIL 95 (2001) 840; C. Tams, “Swimming with the Tide or Seeking 
to Stem It? Recent ICJ Rulings on the Law on Self-Defense” RQDI 18 (2005) 275.
29. Oliver Corten “Territorial Integrity Narrowly Interpreted” supra note 24, at 90.
30. If it is affirmed that non-government entities are also subject to the international 
obligations related to territorial integrity, it must be affirmed, on the same basis, 
that they will also benefit from the principle of non-intervention guaranteed by 
international law. Affirming the former and denying the latter could be a selective 
interpretation.
31. See, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning 
Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; 
and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska.
32. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 81.
33. As a consequence of this illegal situation, the primary effect in the field of international 
responsibility would be the obligation not to recognize the situation created by violation 115
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rity is confined to the sphere of relations between states while the 
principle of non-use of force, that has a procedural substance, is re-
lated to all kind of subjects including non-state actors. Following the 
ICJ, non-use of force is considered ius cogens and that is why it is ap-
plicable also within the territory of the state; evidently, due to the same 
reason this rule must be respected by the central government as well.34
Ultimately, the unilateral nature of declarations of independence 
is not the issue on which the Security Council resolves, but rather, the 
specific circumstances taking place in each case. Moreover, there are 
Security Council resolutions that applaud the access of new States to 
independence. This is the case of the Resolution 1272 (1999) on East 
Timor35 while explicitly welcoming the will of the Timorese people for 
independence, which led to the emergence of a new State. This shows 
that the Security Council sees no contradiction between the respect 
for territorial integrity and processes leading towards independence.
Another argument which could be made against the ICJ’s asser-
tion that the principle of respect of territorial integrity of states is 
confined to the sphere of relations between states could be the exist-
ence of clear standards. It is certainly true that international law in-
creasingly contains rules regulating activities of non-State actors and 
even individuals. However, these rules has not been systematically 
developed as a whole but on a limited and targeted basis concerning 
other issues such as human rights, humanitarian law or individual 
criminal responsibility, issues that are not at stake in the context of a 
declaration of independence. In this regard certain legal documents 
of international law and of a regional scope include the respect for 
the principle of territorial integrity through making reference to as-
pects related to the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples36 
However, reference to sovereignty and territorial integrity in those 
of a fundamental rule of international law (see Theodore Christakis “The ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo” supra note 23, at p. 82).
34. Anne Peters “Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?” supra note 27, at 
p. 106.
35. See Resolution 1272 (1999) on East Timor, paragraph 3. 
36. See Björn Arp “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo and the International 
Protection of Minorities” German Law Journal 11 (2010) 8, pp 853-856). This formulation 
appears in, for example, the Declaration on Minorities of 1992, the European Charter on 
Regional or Minority Languages (art. 5), the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (art 21), and United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (art 46.1). 116
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cases refers to the interpretation of the treaty in which they are in-
cluded, without it being possible to hold that they are general obliga-
tions directed at entities to which those provisions assign no legal 
personality. The goal of these references to the principle of respect 
of the territorial integrity is not to prohibit secession, but to note that 
the (linguistic, minority or indigenous) rights recognised in those trea-
ties do not include the right to external self-determination.37
In summary, the principle of the territorial integrity of States as 
a fundamental principle of the international law does not at all con-
cern the relation between a State and an entity seeking self-determi-
nation. Declarations of independence are considered primarily do-
mestic affairs.38 Such declarations are relevant for international law if 
there is a separate violation of international law, that is to say, in the 
event that the methods used to implement the secession are not in 
accordance with international law. In sum, secession as such can not 
be considered expressly legal or illegal; international law may deals 
with particular declarations of independence, if they are conjoined 
with illegal uses of force or violate other peremptory norms. Examples 
for such violations are the unlawful use of force, the breach of an 
international agreement (as in the case of Cyprus) or racial discrimina-
tion (as in the case of Southern Rhodesia).
From this standpoint, it could not be said that the International 
Court validates the “principle of effectiveness” or consummated facts, 
irrespective of how they are implemented. International law adopts 
a neutral stance on declarations of independence that do not infringe 
peremptory norms. The exercise of democratic rights guaranteed to 
individuals and peoples by international law is the factor that con-
tributes balance to the “principle of effectiveness” in current inter-
national law.39
37. See, Theodore Christakis “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo” supra note 23, p. 85. 
Regarding the scope of Article 5 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Lan-
guages, see Jean-Marie Woehrling, The European Charter for Regional or Minority Lan-
guages. A Critical Commentary (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005) at p. 86, 
highlighting that there is no provision in the Charter which directly challenges the principle 
of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The purpose of Article 5 is primarily to fore-
stall misinterpretation of the Charter. The respect of the geographical area of each regional 
or minority language (art 7.1.b ECRML) does not encroach on national territorial integrity. 
38. See the opinion of Elena Cirkovic “An analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence” German Law Journal Vol. 11, 08, p. 902. 
39. Following to K. Doehring “Effectiveness” EPIL Vol. 7, 1984, p. 70 “effectiveness is only 
legally relevant as far as the legal system permits it.” 117
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3.  Territorial Integrity Inside States: Does the 
International Law Deals With the Declarations of 
Independence?
The question that the General Assembly posed to the International 
Court of Justice was to assess the accordance of the declaration of 
independence of 17 February 2008 with “international law”.40 The 
answer to that question turns on whether or not the international law 
prohibited the declaration of independence. The Court chose to focus 
its answer in terms of non-violation, taking a less demanding approach. 
In any case, there is a big gap between the non-prohibited and allowed 
regarding secession.41 Under the assumption of a presumption against 
the admissibility of secession, the narrow approach of the ICJ left un-
resolved issues: could it be interpreted as a new guideline for coping 
with the deliberate silence of international law? It must be borne in 
mind that the conclusion to draw from deliberate silence (the opposite 
of a legal lacuna) depends on the prior establishment of the residual 
rule (freedom to secede or preservation of the state).42
Perhaps, the wording of the question was not particularly for-
tunate. It was open to the Court to examine the possible legal grounds 
under international law that may be argued to have authorized the 
declaration of independence.43 The ICJ opted for a more formal ap-
proach, leaving aside the substantive issues such as the international 
characterization of the right to secede inside and (eventually) outside 
of the right of self-determination. The question was focused on under 
40. Resolution 63/3 of the General Assembly, 8 October 2008. A/RES/63/3 Sixty-third session. 
Available at http://www.asil.org/files/ilib081017_r3.pdf (last visited on 29 July 2011). There 
were two ways for answering that question: on the one hand, analyzing whether there 
was a rule of international law that conferred a positive entitlement to declare independ-
ence, and on the other hand, focusing on whether there are prohibitive rules against 
declarations of independence. The ICJ adopted the second strategy. Accordingly the Ko-
sovo case contrasts with the Reference relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada, 
where the question put to the Supreme Court of Canada asked whether there was a right 
to “effect secession” and whether there was a rule of international law that conferred 
such a positive entitlement.
41. See Declaration of Judge Simma, paragraph 9.
42. See Anne Peters “Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?” supra note 27, 
p. 99.
43. See Marcelo G. Kohen and Katherine del Mar, “The Kosovo Advisory Opinion and 
UNSCR 1244(1999): A Declaration of Independence from International Law?” Leiden Journal 
of International Law 24 (2011) at 111.118
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the eventual existence of international law provisions establishing the 
way in which internal declarations of independence can be made in 
order to be lawful. There is no explicit rule prohibiting declarations 
of independence and there are no procedural provisions (however 
not all means to achieve the secessionist objective are allowed), and 
neither are there any international treaties that deal with this ques-
tion or any international practices or customs that lay down the meth-
od to be used. What international practice does indicate is that inter-
national law does not deal directly with declarations of independence. 
The current State diversity is the result of a varied and heterogeneous 
range of cases that cannot easily be reduced to precise patterns.44
International law does not authorise the unilateral secession of 
a territory from the State to which it pertains. The international law 
recognises a unilateral right to secede only in certain exceptional cir-
cumstances linked to the right of self-determination. Upon this a ques-
tion arises: to what extent international law affect the legality of a 
unilateral declaration of independence in situations not expressly 
covered by it? International law does not recognise the right to seces-
sion as such, but can it be affirmed that international law denies its 
existence? From the opposing view, why did the Court not resort to 
the Lotus principle?
According to the Lotus principle45 sovereign states may act in 
any way they wish so long as they do not contravene an explicit 
44. The still-unfinished evolution of the right to self-determination shows that from the 
1960s, the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a 
right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples sub-
ject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation (cf. Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstand-
ing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 31-32, 
paragraphs 52-53; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, 
paragraph 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), pp. 171-172, paragraph 88). On this 
regard see J. Crawford, The creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2006) esp. Ch. 3; A. Buchanan “Theories of secession” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 26 (1997) 1, pp. 30-61; Daniel Philpott “Self-Determination in Practice” in M. Moore 
(ed), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
pp. 83-86. H. Hannum Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination. The Accommoda-
tion of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) pp. 3-118. 
A Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, supra note 10, pp. 120-125; J. Castellino, Inter-
national Law and Self-determination, supra note 10, pp. 56-58.
45. See Permanent Court of Justice, SS Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Rep. (1927) Series 
A No 10, at 18: “rules of law binding upon states… emanate from their own free will… 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”119
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prohibition. In the Kosovo AO the residual rule of freedom was not 
applied to the state, but to the authors of the declaration of inde-
pendence.46 Perhaps by doing so the ICJ wanted to confirm that they 
have not proceeded as persons acting inside the legal framework 
of the interim administration but as persons acting outside it.47 In 
any event, the Lotus principle is a principle always protecting the 
sovereign state; being as so, affirming that secession is not prohib-
ited the question that arises is whether or not the Court is insinuat-
ing that that subject have a right to declare independence outside 
the colonial context. As have been said, the ICJ did not resort to the 
Lotus principle but the absence of a prohibition to attempt secession 
can not be assimilated to the existence of a right to do so.48 The 
extreme positivistic approach that Lotus implied, which seems to 
suggest that the international legal order is complete, offers cur-
rently points of challenge, discussion and debate. What is clear is 
that the Kosovo AO provides an open interpretive toolbox highlight-
ing that “it is entirely possible for a particular act such as a unilat-
eral declaration of independence not to be in violation of interna-
tional law without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right 
conferred by it.”49
If the principle of respect of territorial integrity of states is 
confined primarily to the sphere of states and if there is no prohibi-
tion of secession in international law, then what the role of the self-
determination principle is? The ICJ in the Kosovo AO does not address 
this question. The main implications of the right to self-determination 
have to do with the legal entitlement to statehood and especially 
with the recognition by third states. On the basis of a general pre-
sumption against the effectiveness of secession and in favour of the 
territorial integrity of the host state,50 and even considering that 
there is no prohibition to unilateral secession, the fulfilment of the 
external self-determination criteria establishes a positive entitlement 
46. See Anne Peters “Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?” supra note 27, at 
p. 100.
47. See a critical analysis in Marcelo G. Kohen and Katherine del Mar “The Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion and UNSCR 1244(1999)” supra note 43, pp. 109-127.
48. See Theodore Christakis “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo” supra note 23, at p. 79.
49. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at 56.
50. See Theodore Christakis “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo” supra note 23, at p. 84; 
Anne Peters “Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?”, supra note 27, at p. 99.120
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to statehood.51 It definitely provides access to international support. 
On the other hand, if the required exceptional circumstances are not 
met52 there shall be no positive entitlement to self-determination. 
However, in the latter case, is statehood precluded or just unprivi-
leged as it could be the case of Kosovo?53 Following Ralph Wilde’s 
approach here, for sub-state groups who aspire to independence the 
central matter is not so much what the international-law position is 
on the legality of declarations of independence, but rather their 
prospects for enjoying the support of at least the kind of critical mass 
of other states that will make their claim practically viable.54
The ICJ did not address whether the support of certain states 
to the authors in the issuance of the unilateral declaration of in-
dependence would constitute an infringement of the obligation 
not to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state, and the 
obligation to respect the territorial integrity of states. While the 
declaration said that Kosovo is declared to be an independent and 
sovereign state, the International Court does not considerer spe-
cifically the declaration as an act of secession. But if it is as so, what 
was the legal basis for those States that have already recognised 
Kosovo’s independence?55
51. See Marc Weller, “Modesty can be a virtue: Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo Opin-
ion”, Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011) at p. 136, stating that the right of 
self-determination (in the colonial context) generates pre-state legal personality.
52. As it could be, perhaps, the case of Kosovo after 1999 (see Hurst Hannum, “The Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo: An Opportunity Lost, or Poisoned Chalice Refused?” Leiden Journal 
of International Law 24 (2011) at p. 157. Paying attention to the previous 1989-1999 period 
the conclusion could be different (see Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, 
paragraphs 41-42).
53. See Marc Weller, “Modesty can be a virtue” supra note 51, at p. 137. In the view of 
Ralph Wilde “Self-Determination, Secession, and Dispute Settlement after the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion” Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011) at p. 153 it could constitute 
an unlawful violation of the state’s right to territorial integrity. 
54. Ralph Wilde “Self-Determination, Secession, and Dispute Settlement after the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion” supra note 53, at p. 153. See also James Summers “Relativizing Sover-
eignty: Remedial Secession and Humanitarian Intervention in International Law” St Antony’s 
International Review 6 (2010) 1, at p. 16 et seq. 
55. See the reflections of Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel “Delphic Dictum: How Has the ICJ 
Contributed to the Global Rule of Law by its Ruling on Kosovo?” German Law Jornal 11 
(2010) 8, p. 842. See also Jure Vidmar “Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory 
and (Lack of) Practice” St Antony’s International Review 6 (2010) 1, at pp. 37-56 suggesting 
that remedial secession is not tantamount to an entitlement but can only be said to be 
given effect through recognition.121
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There are no provisions in international law that directly regulate 
secession even though secession is indirectly addressed by, at least, the 
law of state succession, the requirements for statehood and the legal-
ity of the recognition by third states. The law of state succession regu-
lates some aspects of secession.56 It is obvious that one cannot tackle 
the question of state succession, i.e. the issue of transmission of rights 
and obligations from one state to another without at first confronting 
the problem of statehood, but the Vienna Conventions’ definition of 
state succession avoids tricky questions as to, what is a state.57
In the Quebec case, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged 
that “[a]lthough there is no legal right, under the Constitution or at 
international law, to unilateral secession […] this does not rule out 
the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading 
to a de facto secession”.58 The Supreme Court seems to indicate that 
the secession will be effective if it is an effective political fact. The 
ultimate success of such secession would be dependent on recognition 
by the international community.59
Thomas M. Franck contends that “[i]t is wrong, to say there is no 
right of secession if by that one seeks to convey the impression that 
any secession is prohibited by international Law”.60 Malcolm Shaw 
opines in the same sense that “[i]t is true that the international com-
munity is very cautious about secessionist attempts, especially when 
56. Secession is a modality of succession of States which can be defined, as “the creation 
of a new independent entity through the separation of part of the territory and popula-
tion of an existing State, without the consent of the latter” Marcelo Kohen, “Introduction”, 
in Marcelo Kohen (ed) Secession. International Law Perspectives (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 3.
57. Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties, 17 ILM (1978) 1488, art. 
2(1)(b); Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Property, Archives and Debts, 
1983, 22 ILM (1983) 306, art. 2(1)(a). See Andreas Zimmermann “Secession and the law of 
State sucesión” in Marcelo Kohen (ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 208-230. 
58. Supreme Court of Canada Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR, para-
graph 155.
59. Defending the constitutive theory on the role of recognition in international law that 
holds that recognition is an essential criterion of statehood, see among others, J. Crawford, 
The Creation of States in International Law supra note 44, at p. 4. The prevailing view on 
recognition is the declaratory theory, according to which statehood is a legal status 
independent of recognition, see among others I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 88.
60. Thomas M. Franck “Experts Report”, reproduced in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-determination 
in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2000) p. 335.122
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the situation is such that threats to international peace and security 
are manifest. Nevertheless, as a matter of law the international system 
neither authorises nor condemns such attempts, but rather stands neu-
tral. Secession, as such, therefore, is not contrary to international law”.61
The precedents regarding declarations of independence and 
recognition of sovereignty show that declarations of independence 
are not, per se, contrary to international law.62 It cannot be argued 
that international law prohibits secession in every case. As a matter 
of international law the issuance of a declaration of independence is 
primarily a factual event: a factual event which together with other 
facts, such as a defined territory and permanent population, may be 
deemed to result, immediately or over time, in the creation of a new 
state. Once an entity breaks off from its mother state and seeks to 
become recognised as a new state, the legal question that arises is 
whether that entity satisfies the relevant international legal criteria 
of statehood. According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention, an en-
tity can achieve statehood if it fulfils four criteria: if it has a defined 
territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to 
enter into international relations.63 Secession appears to be a political 
fact from which conclusions may be drawn under international law 
when it leads to the establishment of effective and stable state au-
thorities. In any case, the claims to secession are favoured or disfa-
voured depending on the facts.
Regarding the unilateral declaration of independence the Inter-
national Court of Justice has confirmed that the obligations of inter-
national law with respect to territorial integrity are only binding upon 
state entities and, likewise, that there is no prohibition in interna-
tional law to such ends. In short “[t]he Court considers that general 
international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations 
of independence. Accordingly, it concludes that the declaration of 
independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general interna-
61. Malcolm Shaw, “Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30 September 1996,” in Self-
De  termination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned, supra note 60, p. 136. 
62. See Austria CR 2009/27 hearing of 3 December 2009, paragraph 18, pp. 10-11.
63. See art. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 Dec. 1933, 
156 LNTS 19. Statehood is a legal theory that seeks to justify the attribution of statehood 
on objective criteria, which are at least in theory independent from the political reality 
underlying many attempts at secession or separation. In fact, article 3 of the Montevideo 
Convention states that “[t]he political existence of the state is independent of recognition 
by the other states.”123
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tional law”.64 In other words, international law remains neutral with 
respect to the declaration of independence made by non-State actors. 
The International Court did not take a position on the effectiveness 
of said declaration.
The International Court of Justice only reaches this point without 
issuing any decision about the exercise of the right to self-determina-
tion or the right of remedial secession in the particular case of Koso-
vo. The Court contends that “[i]t is not necessary to resolve these 
questions in the present case. The General Assembly has requested 
the Court’s opinion only on whether or not the declaration of inde-
pendence is in accordance with international law. Debates regarding 
the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any 
right of “remedial secession”, however, concern the right to separate 
from a State”.65
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the question of self-determi-
nation was not a matter about which the General Assembly request-
ed the opinion of the Court, the latter did not entirely avoid the 
discussion of self-determination.66 The Court does make a brief men-
tion of the differences existing as regards the interpretation of the 
scope of that right. This shows, above all, firstly, that international 
law remains ambiguous in how it treats non-state entities, and sec-
ondly, that international law cannot oppose a declaration of inde-
pendence based on the territorial integrity of the State without this 
affecting the right to self-determination.67 Maybe one of the weak 
points of the ICJ decision is the lack of clarity about how the non-state 
actors are bound by the norm of territorial integrity. What is clear is 
that the principle of territorial integrity of States is not an insurmount-
able obstacle to the peoples entitled to exercise the right to self-de-
64. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 84.
65. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 83.
66. On this regard see Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation XXI (48), UN Doc. A/51/18 (1996) paragraph 4, analysing the distinction 
between internal and external self-determination. While the first one deals with the right 
of all peoples to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development without 
outside interference within the existing borders, the second one reflects the right to all 
peoples to determine freely their political status and their place in the international 
community, dealing in relation to other peoples. 
67. See Margaret Moore “The territorial dimension of Self-Determination” in M. Moore 
(dir.) National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
pp. 134-157. Also Michael P. Scharf, “Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings”, Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 31 (2003), p. 379.124
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termination in accordance with international law, albeit indirectly the 
principle of territorial integrity could be a determinant factor through 
its constraining effect on acts of recognition by other states.
The underlying issue of this approach is the search for a point 
of balance between these two principles –territorial integrity and the 
right to self-determination– and the exercise thereof. In this respect, 
as the Court affirms, “[d]uring the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the international law of self-determination developed in such 
a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-
self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation”.68 Nonetheless, it also underscores the 
existence of declarations of independence outside this context, saying 
that even in these cases they cannot be held to contravene interna-
tional law.69
Therefore, the question we could pose is whether there are 
reasons that justify secession being limited to the scope of decolo-
nisation. If the State fails to provide people sufficient guarantees of 
protection for their development as a group, if the political accom-
modation through the internal self-determination is blocked or per-
sistently and seriously hindered, or if the channels of negotiation 
are exhausted, as was finally the case of Kosovo, would it not be 
reasonable to consider an overriding reason for secession? The anal-
ysis of cases such as that of Croatia or Bangladesh, not linked to a 
colonial context, have led some authors to speak of a “qualified right 
of secession” that would make it possible to exercise external self-
determination, which may be exercised through unilateral secession 
granted by international law to a minority-people within an existing 
State only in certain exceptional circumstances as a measure of last 
resort when the process seeking for a negotiated settlement are 
exhausted, and when a clear majority of the population by demo-
cratic means supports this course for realizing people’s right of self-
68. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 79. See also (cf. Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstand-
ing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 31-32, 
paragraphs 52-53; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, 
paragraph 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 2004 (I), pp. 171-172, paragraph 88.
69. On this matter see the reflections of James Crawford “State Practice and International 
Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession” in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-determination in 
International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned, 2000, supra note 60, p. 65. 125
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determination.70 There is no explicit rule prohibiting declarations of 
independence and, conversely, there is not consensus in the inter-
national community which would have enabled us to discuss a right 
to secede. A possible general interpretation could be that there is 
no absolute right either to remedial secession / external self-deter-
mination or to maintain the statehood over the peoples. The viola-
tion of the right to internal self-determination may lead to using 
the last resort, namely remedial secession, guaranteeing, in addition, 
a procedural guideline: all effective remedies must have been ex-
hausted in the pursuit of a settlement before a people may have 
resort to the exercise of the right to external self-determination.71 
In addition, contemporary international law has established proce-
dural requirements for secession, notably the non-use of force and 
a democratic process.72
This is the approach underlying the position of the Supreme 
Court of Canada when it says “[w]hen a people is blocked from the 
meaningful exercise of its right of self-determination internally, it is 
entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession”.73 The Canadian 
Supreme Court held that a people has a right to internal self-deter-
mination first, and that only if that right is not respected by the moth-
er- state, the same people’s right to break off may accrue. In other 
words, the right to separate is conditioned on the non-respect of the 
right to some form of provincial autonomy.74
The ICJ in the Kosovo AO took not position on the issue, high-
lighting that there are radically different views in relation to the exist-
ence of such a right.75 Meanwhile, following Marc Weller, it would be 
wrong to claim that the Court has therefore denied the existence of 
this right, given the requirement in international law of widespread 
70. David Raic, Statehood and Self-Determination (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2002) p. 365.
71. See, inter alia, Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, David Wippman, International Law, 
Norms, Actors, Process (Aspen Publishers, 2010) p. 222. 
72. See Anne Peters “Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?” supra note 27, at 
p. 99.
73. Supreme Court of Canada Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 11, paragraph 134.
74. See Milena Sterio “The Kosovar Declaration of Independence: “Botching the Balkans” 
or Respecting International Law?” supra note 26, p. 10; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, 
David Wippman, International Law: Norms, Actors, Process, supra note 71, at p. 222.
75. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 31.126
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and uniform practice and opinio iuris, which is apparently not met.76 
It could be a right in the process of emerging but that has in any event 
not yet been consolidated.
As affirmed by the Finnish Delegation in the proceedings before 
the International Court of Justice, a ruling on the operation of the 
principle of self-determination cannot be issued without an analysis 
of the specific case.77 It is true that since 1945 the operation of the 
right to self-determination has been restricted to the colonial sphere, 
which practice has remained unaltered since 1989, although it must 
be mentioned that during that period, 22 new States have been rec-
ognised.78 The remedial character of self-determination has been af-
firmed by the International Court of Justice in its Western Sahara 
case.79 At all events, it must also be said that in the Advisory Opinion 
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory, the Court, for the first time, accepted a 
right of self-determination outside the context of decolonisation.80 
The right to self-determination includes the right of peoples to free-
ly determine their political status.
In most extra-colonial cases, the international community has not 
considered secession as an exercise of the right to self-determination, 
but as a consequence of covenants and agreements, in some cases 
founded on international law and in others, founded on the internal 
relations between the peoples aspiring to sovereignty and their States, 
also as a consequence of the “special”, “unique” or sui generis char-
acter of the case. The question that may be raised is, is this not a ma-
76. Marc Weller, “Modesty Can Be a Virtue” supra note 51, at p. 137.
77. Finland, CR 2009/30, hearing of 8 December 2009, paragraph 24, p. 62.
78. James Crawford “State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession” 
in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned, 
2000, supra note 60, p. 60.
79. ICJ Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 on Western Sahara (1975 I.C.J. 25), paragraphs 
55-60, pp. 23-26. See also the case concerning Northern Cameroon (Cameroon v. United 
Kingdom) 1963 I.C.J. 3; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) 1986, I.C.J. 14; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru 
(Nauru v. Australia) 1989 I.C.J. 12, 1991 ICJ 3; and East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) 1995 
I.C.J. 90.
80. ICJ Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, paragraph 88, p. 39 and paragraph 122, p. 
184. The Court indeed made it clear that the right of peoples to self-determination is 
today a right erga omnes (see, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J. p. 102, para-
graph 29).127
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nifestation of the right to self-determination? Is it not true that the 
cases in which sovereignty has been obtained outside the colonial 
context respond to the classic rule of self-determination that always 
seeks to strike a balance between territorial integrity and the free 
development of peoples, making it possible to use an external solution 
as a last resort? It appears clear that a ruling regarding the current 
manner of exercising of the right to self-determination cannot be is-
sued without taking into account and analysing each specific case, and 
this may contain the key to the question of exercising the right to 
self-determination at present, above and beyond more or less restric-
tive doctrinal theories.
4.  Territorial Integrity and the Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999)
Resolution 1244 (1999) was adopted by the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on 10 June 1999 and 
therefore clearly imposes international legal obligations.81 In this res-
olution, the Security Council, “determined to resolve the grave hu-
manitarian situation” and to put an end to the armed conflict in 
Kosovo, authorized the United Nations Secretary-General to establish 
an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide “[a]n 
interim administration for Kosovo which will provide transitional ad-
ministration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions 
for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.”82
In essence, resolution 1244 (1999) did four things. It adopted 
measures to secure and maintain an end to violence in Kosovo.83 It 
81. ICJ Kosovo AO, supra note 5, paragraph 85. The Court observes, also, that UNMIK 
regulations, including regulation 2001/9, which promulgated the Constitutional Framework, 
are adopted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of the 
authority derived from Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), notably its paragraphs 6, 
10, and 11, and thus ultimately from the United Nations Charter. The Constitutional Frame-
work derives its binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and 
thus from international law. In that sense it therefore possesses an international legal 
character.
82. Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) on the situation relating Kosovo. S/RES/1244 
(1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999, para-
graph 10.
83. See paragraphs 3, 9 and 15 of the Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).128
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established interim institutions to ensure conditions for peace and 
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.84 It established an interim 
framework based on substantial self-government for Kosovo taking 
full account of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.85 And it put in train a political process designed 
to determine Kosovo’s future status.86
The question raised by Serbia was that insofar as the authors of 
the declaration of independence of Kosovo were the Provisional In-
stitutions of Self-Government in Kosovo, that declaration should be 
considered as being in violation of international law, particularly 
resolution 1244 (1999). It also affirmed that “[r]ather than providing 
for a right of Kosovo to separate from Serbia, resolution 1244 for-
mally reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Serbia. It thus precluded 
the possibility of Kosovo unilaterally seceding. Instead, resolution 1244 
provided for a political process to determine the future status of Ko-
sovo by way of an agreed settlement to be endorsed by the Security 
Council. No hint of a referendum, not even by way of cross-reference, 
and no reference to the right of self-determination can be found in 
resolution 1244.”87
International intervention in the government of Kosovo and the 
establishment of provisional democratic self-governing institutions 
(PISG) backed by the UN gave the case of the declaration of independ-
ence a series of unique characteristics. It should be considered that a 
declaration of independence made in a context of provisional govern-
ment intervention by the UN could be deemed contrary to interna-
tional law, precisely due to its possible incompatibility with the Res-
olution of the Security Council. Note that under that resolution the 
Security Council decided to create the provisional institutions whose 
task was to locally govern the territory of Kosovo in a democratic and 
autonomous manner “pending a political settlement”. PISG must op-
erate within the legal framework established by the Security Council, 
84. See paragraphs 5, 6 and specially 10 of the Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
85. See paragraph 11 of the Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). This character was set 
out in detail in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo regulation 
2001/9 of 15 May 2001 on a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government 
(hereinafter “Constitutional Framework”). This resolution defined the distribution of pow-
ers and responsibilities between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and 
the Provisional Institutions of Self Government of Kosovo.
86. See in particular paragraph 11.e) of the Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
87. Serbia CR 2009/24, hearing of 1 December 2009, paragraph 11, p. 51.129
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and a unilateral declaration of independence by the PISG will be re-
garded as contrary to the resolution 1244. Therefore, the questions 
posed in relation to the preventive effects of resolution 1244 (1999) 
referred back to two aspects: on the one hand, to the identification 
of the subject responsible for the same, to ascertain whether these 
are the self-governing institutions endorsed by the international com-
munity, acting on the basis of the powers granted by resolution 1244 
(1999); and on the other, whether the contents of resolution 1244 (1999) 
contain provisions that are incompatible with the declaration of in-
dependence.
Both questions were analysed by the International Court of Jus-
tice. In relation to the identification of the subject, the Court starts 
by delimiting the context of the declaration of independence and 
states that the language used in the declaration indicates that the 
action was not taken within the framework of interim self-adminis-
tration of Kosovo, but that they were aimed at establishing Kosovo 
“as an independent and sovereign state”. The Court arrives at the 
conclusion that “[t]he declaration of independence, therefore, was 
not intended by those who adopted it to take effect within the legal 
order created for the interim phase, nor was it capable of doing so. 
On the contrary, the Court considers that the authors of that declara-
tion did not act, or intend to act, in the capacity of an institution 
created by and empowered to act within that legal order but, rather, 
set out to adopt a measure the significance and effects of which would 
lie outside that order.”88 Furthermore the Court underscores that the 
words “Assembly of Kosovo” only appear on the heading of the trans-
lations of the declaration of independence in English and French, but 
not in the original text drafted in Albanian, and also that the text 
starts with the words “We, the democratically-elected leaders of our 
people…” without the Kosovo Assembly being named as the subject, 
in addition to the fact that the President of Kosovo, who is not a 
member of the Assembly of Kosovo, signed the document.89 Even so, 
88. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 105.
89. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 107. The International Court also points out 
that it is also noticeable that the declaration was not forwarded to the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General for publication in the Official Gazette. The reaction of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the declaration of independence 
is also of some significance. The Constitutional Framework gave the Special Representa-
tive power to oversee and, in certain circumstances, annul the acts of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government. On previous occasions, in particular in the period between 130
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“[t]The Court thus arrives at the conclusion that, taking all factors 
together, the authors of the declaration of independence of 17 Febru-
ary 2008 did not act as one of the provisional Institutions of Self-
Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as per-
sons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the 
people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration”.90
Regarding the identification of the authors of the declaration of 
independence, the opinion of the majority of the members of the ICJ 
could be subject to criticism.91 The question put to the Court was re-
ferred to the accordance with the international law of the declaration 
of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo. As Judge Koroma stated, “the General Assembly has clearly 
stated that it views the unilateral declaration of independence as hav-
ing been made by the provisional institutions of self-government of 
Kosovo.”92 The wording of the declaration refers to the Assembly 
of Kosovo several times.93 . Even if the declaration of independence 
was adopted by the Assembly, the president and the prime minister of 
Kosovo, they all constituted organs of the Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government of Kosovo. All of them were acting in that ca-
pacity, since they considered themselves to be the democratically 
elected representatives. As Judge Tomka highlights they wished to 
act in accordance with the legal framework and not outside of it.94 
Indeed the Court stressed the content of the declaration in order to 
justify that the authors were not acting within the standard frame-
work of the interim administration. In this regard the Judge Ben-
2002 and 2005, when the Assembly of Kosovo took initiatives to promote the independ-
ence of Kosovo, the Special Representative had qualified a number of acts as being in-
compatible with the Constitutional Framework on the grounds that they were deemed 
to be “beyond the scope of [the Assembly’s] competencies”. The silence of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General in the face of the declaration of independence 
of 17 February 2008 suggests that he did not consider that the declaration was an act of 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government designed to take effect within the legal 
order for the supervision of which he was responsible.
90. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 109.
91. The issue on the authorship of the declaration of independence was emerged during 
the written phase of the advisory proceedings. During the previous phases all the 
intervenients agree with the fact that the Assembly of Kosovo had issued the declaration 
of independence. 
92. Declaration of Judge Koroma, paragraph 3.
93. See first preambular paragraph of the declaration referring the Assembly of Kosovo.
94. See Declaration Judge Tomka, paragraphs 19-20.131
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nouna stated that “[i]n law, it is not merely because an institution 
has adopted an act exceeding its powers (ultra vires) that the legal 
bond between the institution and the act is broken. In such a case, the 
institution must be considered to be in breach of the legal framework 
that justifies and legitimizes it.”95 As a result of the Court’s finding that 
the declaration was not an ultra vires act because the authors were 
acting in a different capacity, the Court effectively absolved the Unit-
ed Nations of international responsibility for the issuance of the dec-
laration of independence.96
The second question is in relation to the content of resolution 
1244 (1999). Serbia and many other states asserted that the resolution, 
referring to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the Security Coun-
cil actually prohibited the parties to act unilaterally, and that therefore, 
the independence of Kosovo was not compatible with it.97 Based on 
this approach, a permanent settlement for Kosovo could only be 
achieved by agreement of all parties involved (notably including the 
consent of the Republic of Serbia) or by a specific Security Council 
resolution endorsing a specific final status for Kosovo.
The International Court of Justice does not so much focus on the 
question from that standpoint as from the standpoint of the purpose 
of the resolution 1244 (1999). The Court affirms, in agreement with 
the position of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, 
among others, that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) was es-
sentially designed to create an interim regime for Kosovo, with a view 
to channelling the long-term political process to establish its final 
status. In other words, the resolution contains no provisions dealing 
with the final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its achieve-
ment. Resolution 1244 (1999) does not reserve for itself the final de-
termination of the status of Kosovo and remains silent with respect 
to those conditions.98 Even so, “[r]esolution 1244 (1999) thus does not 
preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence of 17 Febru-
ary 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: 
95. See Declaration of Judge Bennouna, paragraph 44.
96. See Marcelo G. Kohen and Katherine del Mar “The Kosovo Advisory Opinion” supra 
note 43, at p. 121.
97. Serbia CR 2009/24 hearing of 1 December 2009, paragraphs 7, p. 33; paragraph 30, 
p. 45; and specially paragraphs 7-22, pp. 50-57; Russia CR 2009/30 hearing of 8 December 
2009, paragraphs 32-43 pp. 46-48.
98. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 114.132
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unlike resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an 
attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo”.99 That is, the sys-
tem regulated by the resolution is provisional, and its objective is to 
facilitate the final status of Kosovo, whereas the declaration of inde-
pendence would have a decisive effect to the extent that it estab-
lishes that final status. In the final analysis, “[t]he Court cannot accept 
the argument that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) contains a 
prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independ-
ence, against declaring independence; nor can such a prohibition be 
derived from the language of the resolution understood in its context 
and considering its object and purpose”.100
The approach taken by the Court implicitly condoning the uni-
lateral imposition of an outcome by one party in a settlement-of-
dispute could be considered paradoxical. The Court’s position could 
be seen as a license to use unilateral means, even when the Security 
Council has adopted a resolution founded on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.101 The question suggested by the approach used by the Court 
is that the territorial integrity of Serbia does not appear to be consid-
ered an essential aspect of resolution 1244 (1999). Neither is there a 
need for agreement between the parties, a “political settlement”102 
as a condition of the final status for Kosovo, at least with respect to 
the declaration of independence. In effect, the political settlement 
mentioned in section 11,c) of resolution 1244 (1999) makes reference 
to the responsibilities of the international civil mission in Kosovo, and 
not so much to the parties: Serbia and Kosovo.103 A strict interpreta-
tion of the resolution may lead to that conclusion.
The reference to the territorial integrity of the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia was included in the preamble of resolution 1244 
(1999).104 In any case, its context is addressed to member states and 
99. Ibid. 
100. Kosovo AO, supra note 5, at paragraph 118.
101. See Oliver Corten “Territorial Integrity Narrowly Interpreted” supra note 24, at p. 94.
102. See paragraph 11 (c) of the resolution 1244 (1999) that says: “[t]he main 
responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: … c) [o]rganising and 
overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous 
self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections.” 
(Emphasis added). 
103. See Kosovo AO supra note 5, at paragraph 118 (in fine). 
104. The 10th paragraph of the preamble states as follows: “[R]eaffirming the commitment 
of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic 133
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not to non-state entities.105 Even if the Resolution affirms the neces-
sity to respect the territorial integrity, this does not mean that this 
principle is applicable in the relations between the state and the 
secessionist group.106 Secondly, annex 2 of resolution 1244 (1999) 
also contains a reference to territorial integrity, albeit its scope has 
to be interpreted through a general reading of the provision. It reads 
thus: “[A] political process towards the establishment of an interim 
political framework agreement providing for substantial self-gov-
ernment for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords 
and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, 
and the demilitarisation of UCK.”
Annex 2, the scope of which is limited to the interim period, 
refers the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity in a co-
ordinated manner with the consideration of the Rambouillet accords. 
These accords are also mentioned in section 11,c) of resolution 1244 
(1999) that envisages “[a] political process designed to determine Ko-
sovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords.”107 
The Rambouillet accords108 established that the final settlement for 
Kosovo was to be based on the “will of the people”. Chap. 8, Art. I 
(3) contains the following provision:
 [T]hree years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an 
international meeting shall be convened to determine a mecha-
of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and 
annex 2.”
105. It is worth remembering that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia protest at the time that 
the resolution was adopted saying that “[o]pens up the possibility of the secession of Ko  sovo 
... from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Remarks of Mr. Jovanovi´ c, Char  gé 
d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, in Security Council 
debate on adoption of resolution 1244, S/PV.4011, 10 June 1999, p. 6, Dossier No. 33).
106. See Oliver Corten, supra note 24, at p. 94 concluding that even in this case the classical 
inter-state paradigm of international law still remains.
107. On this regard and the historical context see James Crawford, The Creation of States 
in International Law, supra note 44, at p. 63; Peter Radan, The Break-Up Of Yugoslavia 
And International Law Routledge Studies in International Law (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002) pp. 196-197. Rob Dickinson, “Twenty-First Century Self-Determination: 
Implications of the Kosovo Status Settlement for Tibet” Arizona Journal of International 
& Comparative Law Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 562.
108. See 125.2. Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 
1999, UN Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/
eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords].134
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nism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will 
of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s 
efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and 
the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive as-
sessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to con-
sider proposals by any Party for additional measures. (S/1999/648).
The paragraph is not very clear but the concept of mutual consent 
was not incorporated.109 Based on the above, it can be upheld that the 
scope of resolution 1244 (1999) does not oppose a declaration of in-
dependence, and that the basic aspect of the final solution is the free 
will of the people of Kosovo. However, as Hurst Hannum highlights, 
by mandating that one potentially crucial element of that dialogue be 
ignored, the entire concept is undermined.110 There is nothing magical 
about existing state borders, which may always be changed by agree-
ment. There is no fundamental moral or political reason why Kosovo 
should not be independent, either, even if that independence is not 
currently mandated or even supported by general international law.111
5. Conclusion
Does the recognition of the independence of Kosovo by 69 United 
Nation’s member States (at the time of the Advisory Opinion) violate 
the obligations not to interfere in Serbia’s domestic affairs and espe-
cially not with the territorial integrity of Serbia? What could have 
happened if the ICJ had affirmed that the declaration of independence 
was unlawful? Could reasonably be expected more from the ICJ? The 
Kosovo AO leaves some critical issues unresolved but in the same time 
109. On this regard see USA CR 2009/30 hearing of 8 December 2009, paragraph 24, p. 32: 
“[I]n the negotiations over the Accords –and the four so-called “Hill Agreements” upon 
which Rambouillet was modeled– the negotiators rejected any requirement that the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia consent before Kosovo’s future status could be finally deter-
mined53. As Professor Murphy explained last Tuesday (CR 2009/25), the first three drafts 
of the Hill Agreements would have required the FRY’s express agreement to change Ko-
sovo’s status at the end of the interim period. But, in the fourth draft of the Hill Agree-
ment, that language was placed in brackets, and no similar requirement for Belgrade’s 
approval of future status appeared in the final version of either the Rambouillet Accords 
or resolution 1244.”
110. Hurst Hannum “The advisory opinion on Kosovo”, supra note 52, at p. 161.
111. Ibid.135
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it contains important findings related to the principle of territorial 
integrity of states, among which we highlight the following:
1. The principle of the territorial integrity of states is a basic 
principle of international law and operates primarily on the inter-
state sphere. It does not affect individuals or peoples, but rather, re-
lations between states. International law does not authorise the uni-
lateral secession of a territory from the state to which it pertains but 
the prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is not im-
plicit in the principle of territorial integrity. There is no prohibition of 
unilateral secession in international law. Respect for territorial inte-
grity operates with external relevance, but in the current system of 
international law, it does not do so with internal relevance.
2. When dealing with non-state entities, the international prin-
ciple of territorial integrity has a limited scope, whose effects are 
indirect acting in a secondary level: the level of the effectiveness of 
the secession and the recognition by third states. The ICJ has not chal-
lenged the traditional conception that the non-state entities are not 
addressed by the rule of territorial integrity but it has strengthened 
this view. Stating that the scope of the principle of territorial integ-
rity is confined to the sphere of relations between States, the ICJ has 
refused to admit some new extensive interpretation of the rule of 
territorial integrity. The principle of territorial integrity is confined to 
the sphere of relations between states while the principle of non-use 
of force, that has a procedural substance, is related to all kind of 
subjects including non-state actors. In any case, the ban on unilateral 
secession is not a ban on sub-state actors but a ban on states to rec-
ognize entities created such unlawful circumstances. A state remains 
a matter of fact.
3. The Kosovo AO has confirmed the traditional view that in-
ternational law remains neutral in regard to secession. Upholding 
the strictly inter-state character of the territorial integrity principle, 
the Court refused to challenge the “legal neutrality” thesis. There 
is no prohibition of unilateral secession. Secession as such can not 
be considered expressly legal or illegal; secession is not regulated by 
international law but international law may deals with particular 
declarations of independence, if they are conjoined with illegal uses 
of force or violate other peremptory norms. These are concerns re-
garding the process and the effectiveness of secession. Only peaceful 
and democratic procedures are allowed while the use of force is 
prohibited.136
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4. The Kosovo AO appears to point not so much in the positive 
legal entitlement (the right to secede) as in the absence of a general 
international law prohibiting the declarations of independence. The 
legal neutrality argument seems to be applicable regardless of the 
legitimating title but not regardless of the procedural circumstances, 
as the following:
– The non-use of force. This principle is considered ius cogens 
and that is why it is applicable also within the territory of the state; 
evidently, due to the same reason this rule must be respected by the 
central government as well.
– The process seeking for a negotiated settlement must be ex-
hausted.
– The process must be democratic (a clear majority of the popu-
lation by democratic means must supports this course).
5. If there is no prohibition of secession in international law and 
the respect for the territorial integrity is a binding principle only for 
states, how does the principle of self-determination operates? In order 
to answer this question a distinction must be drawn between the fol-
lowing two scenarios:
a) In the case of declarations of independence inside de tradi-
tional self-determination collective right, the general presumption 
against the effectiveness of secession and in favour of the territorial 
integrity of the host state does not operate, providing access to inter-
national support. International law cannot oppose a declaration of 
independence based on the territorial integrity of the state without 
this affecting the right to self-determination. The territorial integrity 
of the state is not a principle alien to international law, although it 
cannot block the exercise of other rights also recognised by interna-
tional law to other subjects, such as to the peoples and specially the 
right to external self-determination as a last resort. International 
law remains neutral as regards the declarations of independence 
that do not infringe peremptory norms. The exercise of the right to 
self-determination in accordance of each specific case and through 
the democratic rights guaranteed to individuals by international law 
is the balancing factor of the “principle of effectiveness”. Interna-
tional law cannot oppose a declaration of independence on the ba-
sis of the territorial integrity of states without affecting the right to 
self-determination.
b) In the case of declarations of independence outside the con-
text of the international law of self-determination (even during the 
second half of the twentieth century), the practice of the states does 137
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not point to the emerge in international law of a new rule prohibiting 
the making of a declaration of independence. The ICJ considers that 
there is no emerging prohibition of secession as arising from the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity. The question that arises in such cases is 
whether or not the statehood is precluded or just unprivileged. In any 
case, the International Court did not take a position on the effective-
ness of said declaration. The Court did not pronounce upon whether 
a right to unilaterally secede territory exists, nor did it articulate any 
legal criteria for the creation of states outside self-determination. We 
can conclude, however, that there is no explicit rule prohibiting dec-
larations of independence and, conversely, there is not consensus in 
the international community which would have enabled us to discuss 
a positive right to secede. After the Kosovo AO it would be wrong to 
claim that the Court has therefore denied the existence of this right. 
Could it be considered as a right in the process of emerging? Or to 
what extent international law affect the legality of a unilateral dec-
laration of independence in situations not expressly covered by it?
In view of the current state of development of the international 
law, the legitimacy of declarations of independence that do not in-
fringe peremptory norms will ultimately depend first and foremost 
on the democratically-expressed opinion of the citizens living in the 
concerned  territory and also on the circumstances of each case. The 
democratic principle seems to emerge as the balancing factor of the 
principle of effectiveness and represents the most important contri-
bution to stability.138
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ABSTRACT
On 17 February 2008 Kosovo approved its declaration of independence from 
Serbia. The declaration was raised as a unilateral secession, a category which 
to date is widely debated by the international community, but supported 
in that case by a respectable number of the United Nation member states. 
A great many legal issues have been raised by the International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. This opinion was eagerly awaited by 
legal scholars due to both its possible effects and the scope of its principles 
outside the context of decolonization in what it could constitute of new 
approach to the international scenario for the twenty-first century. The ICJ 
stated that the declaration of independence was in accordance with inter-
national law if it was not prohibited. The answer turned on whether or not 
international law prohibited the declaration of independence, without ever 
examining whether an entity seeking secession is entitled with a positive 
right to secede and if so, under which circumstances. The basic issue can be 
summarised as whether or not we are facing a new course in the interpreta-
tion of certain classical categories of international law: the principle of ter-
ritorial integrity, statehood, sovereignty, recognition, the right to external 
self-determination, etc. In this study we shall analyse some of the aspects 
arising from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
the Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of in-
dependence in respect of Kosovo focusing on the territorial issue. Firstly we 
shall analyse the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States and 
how it operates; secondly, we shall focus on the scope of that principle in 
relation to the interior of the State, and ask ourselves how international 
law operates in relation to declarations of independence. Lastly, we shall 
deal with the principle of respect for territorial integrity in the specific case 
of Serbia with respect to Kosovo, and then end with a series of general 
conclusions. This study aims, definitely, to contribute to the theoretical de-
bate on the challenges to the traditional certainties of international law in 
this area.
Key words: territorial integrity; self-determination; declaration of indepen-
dence; secession.
RESUM
El 17 de febrer de 2008, Kosovo va aprovar la declaració d’independència de 
Sèrbia. La declaració es va fer en qualitat de secessió unilateral, una catego-
ria que fins al moment present està sent àmpliament debatuda per la comu-
nitat internacional. Un nombre respectable dels Estats membres de Nacions 
Unides hi van donar suport. S’han sotmès moltes qüestions jurídiques sobre 139
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la independència de Kosovo a informe consultiu del Tribunal Internacional 
de Justícia. L’informe ha estat llargament esperat pels estudiosos del dret, 
tant pels seus efectes com per l’abast dels seus principis fora del context de 
descolonització, per tal com podria constituir un nou enfocament sobre 
l’escenari internacional del segle XXI. El Tribunal Internacional de Justícia va 
concloure que la declaració d’independència era conforme al dret interna-
cional sempre que aquell no la prohibís expressament. El contingut de 
l’informe pivotava entorn de si el dret internacional prohibeix o no la decla-
ració d’independència, sense entrar a dirimir si a una entitat que busca la 
secessió l’assisteix un dret positiu a la secessió ni, en cas afirmatiu, en quines 
circumstàncies. La qüestió bàsica és si estem o no estem davant d’un nou curs 
en la interpretació de certes categories clàssiques del dret internacional: el 
principi d’integritat territorial, què dóna carta de naturalesa a un estat, la 
sobirania, el reconeixement, el dret a la lliure determinació externa, etc. En 
aquest estudi analitzem alguns dels aspectes que sorgeixen en l’informe 
consultiu del Tribunal Internacional de Justícia sobre la conformitat amb el 
dret internacional de la declaració unilateral d’independència de Kosovo a 
partir de la qüestió territorial. En primer lloc analitzarem l’abast del principi 
d’integritat territorial dels estats i la forma en què opera; en segon lloc, ens 
centrarem en l’àmbit d’aplicació d’aquest principi en relació amb l’interior 
de l’Estat, i ens preguntarem com opera el dret internacional en relació amb 
les declaracions d’independència. Finalment, tractarem el principi de respec-
te a la integritat territorial en el cas específic de Sèrbia respecte de Kosovo, 
i acabarem amb una sèrie de conclusions generals. Aquest estudi té com a 
objectiu, en definitiva, contribuir al debat teòric sobre els desafiaments a les 
certeses tradicionals del dret internacional sobre aquesta qüestió.
Paraules clau: autodeterminació; declaració d’independència; integritat terri-
torial; secessió.
RESUMEn
El 17 de febrero de 2008, Kosovo aprobó su declaración de independencia 
de Serbia. La declaración se hizo en calidad de secesión unilateral, una cate-
goría que hasta el momento presente está siendo ampliamente debatida por 
la comunidad internacional. Un número respetable de estados miembros de 
Naciones Unidas le prestaron su apoyo. Numerosas cuestiones jurídicas sobre 
la independencia de Kosovo han sido sometidas a informe consultivo del 
Tribunal Internacional de Justicia. El informe ha sido largamente esperado 
por los estudiosos del derecho, tanto por sus efectos como por el alcance de 
sus principios fuera del contexto de descolonización, ya que podría constituir 
un nuevo enfoque sobre el escenario internacional del siglo XXI. El Tribunal 
Internacional de Justicia concluyó que la declaración de independencia era 
conforme al derecho internacional siempre que aquel no la prohibiera ex-140
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presamente. El contenido del informe pivotaba en torno a si el derecho in-
ternacional prohíbe o no la declaración de independencia, sin entrar a dirimir 
si a una entidad que busca la secesión le asiste un derecho positivo a la se-
cesión ni, en caso afirmativo, en qué circunstancias. La cuestión básica es si 
nos encontramos o no ante un nuevo curso en la interpretación de ciertas 
categorías clásicas del derecho internacional: el principio de integridad te-
rritorial, qué da carta de naturaleza a un estado, la soberanía, el reconoci-
miento, el derecho a la libre determinación externa, etc. En este estudio 
analizamos algunos de los aspectos que surgen en el informe consultivo del 
Tribunal Internacional de Justicia sobre la conformidad al derecho interna-
cional de la declaración unilateral de independencia de Kosovo a partir de 
la cuestión territorial. En primer lugar analizaremos el alcance del principio 
de integridad territorial de los estados y la forma en que opera; en segundo 
lugar, nos centraremos en el ámbito de aplicación de este principio en relación 
con el interior del Estado, y nos preguntamos cómo opera el derecho inter-
nacional en relación con las declaraciones de independencia. Finalmente, 
trataremos el principio de respeto a la integridad territorial en el caso espe-
cífico de Serbia respecto de Kosovo, y acabaremos con una serie de conclu-
siones generales. Este estudio tiene como objetivo, en definitiva, contribuir 
al debate teórico sobre los desafíos a las certezas tradicionales del derecho 
internacional sobre esta cuestión.
Palabras clave: autodeterminación; declaración de independencia; integridad 
territorial; secesión.